THE GREAT LAKES REGION CONFLICT CASE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

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ABSTRACT  

Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo continues to causes countless death and
destruction of property thus posing greater insecurity in the entire Great lakes region, with DRC
security forces and non-state armed groups responsible for serious abuses against civilians. The
Rwandan-backed M23 armed group continues to perpetrate widespread war crimes, including
summary executions, rapes, and forced recruitment of children into their forces. Numerous other
armed groups have carried out horrific attacks on civilians in eastern Congo, including in North
and South Kivu, Katanga, and Orientale provinces. Fighters from the Nduma Defense of Congo
militia group, led by Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka, killed, raped, and mutilated scores of civilians in
North Kivu. They include the Raia Mutomboki, the Nyatura, the Mai Mai Kifuafua, and the
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a largely Rwandan Hutu armed group,
some of whose members participated in the Rwandan genocide in 1994.The conflict revolve
around minerals and poor governance. This research paper looks objectively on the causes of
conflict, conflict management approaches and the social economic impact of conflict in DRC and
the entire Great Lakes region. Greed grievance theory is employed to guide in data collection and
analysis. The research paper uses qualitative research design and collection of data done through
secondary data from already published material on DRC conflict. The research concludes and
recommends measures to be put in place to bring about peace.
.

                                                                          

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the research problem
The ongoing conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, where up to 6 million excess
deaths have been recorded since 1998 and government neither controls nor governs its territory
in a meaningful sense, is cause for concern to the international community and the United States
government. The Democratic Republic of (DRC) Congo is home to more than 60 million people
who have suffered profoundly as a result of their state’s collapse and a series of local, national,
and international conflicts that began in the early 1990’s and some of which continue until today.
In the aftermath of the contentious and contested November 2011 elections, DRC’s future
stability and ability to develop are both in question. In the United States, the issue of conflict
minerals has become one of the dominant narratives about the conflict. As Autesserre notes,
however, the overwhelming focus on conflict minerals as a cause of conflict in the D.R. Congo
has perverse consequences that actually prevent international and local actors from developing a
comprehensive solution to the country’s conflicts1
Moreover, Western advocacy efforts on conflict minerals have thus far made life more difficult
for many Congolese while failing to stop the violence they purport to address. Instead, these
efforts have thus far increased smuggling,2 led armed groups to seek other sources of revenue,
and left up to 2 million Congolese artisanal miners out of work. As is the case with the
1
Séverine Autesserre, “Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and their Unintended Consequences.”
African Affairs (Forthcoming 2012).
2
Jonny Hogg and Graham Holliday, “Conflict minerals crackdown backfiring in Congo.” Reuters (30
December 2011). Available: http://af.reuters.com/article/drcNews/idAFL6E7NU25720111230?sp=true
2
Kimberley Process, good intentions and the belief that attacking the perceived economic roots of
conflict was a path to peace have largely proved ineffective.
In the context of the geo-strategic importance of the DRC and the abundance of highly sought
after natural and mineral resources within its borders, national interest considerations have
contributed to continued conflict .Neighboring countries such as Uganda and Rwanda have been
accused of Aiding Militia Groups such M23 to destabilize the DRC Government with the main
interest being illegal exploitation of natural resources.
The conflict, in Democratic Republic of Congo is fuelled by exploitation of natural resources and
power struggles, is characterized as one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises and the most
deadly war ever documented in Africa. Over the past five years, the forces of at least six African
countries and numerous non-state armed groups have been involved in the conflict in DRC. Both
foreign and domestic parties to the conflict have committed gross violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law, including widespread abuses against Congolese children and
adolescents. The situation in DRC is also a result of decades of poor governance and broader
regional insecurity3.
The war has taken an enormous toll on children and other civilians Over 12 percent of children
do not reach their first birthday. Approximately one quarter of all children under age five in
Basankusu, Orientale Province, an area that was close to the front line at that time, had died over
a 12-month period, while the normal mortality rate over the same time period for the same age
3 International Rescue Committee (IRC) report, Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Results from a
Nationwide Survey, Conducted September to November 2002, reported April 2003.
3
group is 3.6 percent. Attributes to the increased death rate in Basankusu and other parts of DRC
mainly due to an increase in infectious diseases and malnutrition due to loss of food, assets, basic
services and medicine because of war-related violence.4
Many of the armed forces operating in DRC have splintered into various movements and shifted
alliances over the years. Rights abuses committed against children by combatants associated with
all armed groups in DRC are egregious and well documented. Moreover, the occupation of large
portions of DRC by the armies of neighbouring states has caused considerable suffering among
children and other vulnerable groups. In 2002, most foreign armed forces withdrew from
positions in DRC
When conflict erupted in 1998, the governments of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe supported
the DRC government by deploying elements of their national armed forces to positions in DRC.
At the same time, Rwandan and Ugandan armed forces fought alongside the Congolese
opposition groups, many of which they helped to create, including Congolese Rally for
Democracy-Goma (RCD-G), the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) and the
Congolese Rally for Democracy-Kisangani (RCDK),now known as Congolese Rally for
Democracy-Kisangani/Liberation Movement (RCD-K/ML).5
In July 1999, under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the DRC
government, Congolese armed opposition groups and foreign states signed the Lusaka Ceasefire
4 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). In 2001, Médecins sans Frontières (MSF)
5
The Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) and the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)
split into two factions in 1999, the RCD-Goma (RCD-G)and the RCD-Kisangani (RCD-K), which later
became RCD-K/ML. The armed forces of Uganda have traditionally supported the RCD-K/ML and the
MLC, while the armed forces of Rwanda have traditionally supported RCD-Goma
4
Agreement.6 To monitor this agreement as requested, the UN deployed a peace keeping
operation, United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUC).Also, in accordance with the agreement, several foreign countries involved in the
conflict began to disengage. Most foreign troops, including those of Angola, Namibia, Rwanda,
Uganda and Zimbabwe, withdrew during 2002.
The Rwandan and Ugandan withdrawals were arranged through two separate bilateral peace
agreements with the government of DRC. Most signatories have not upheld peace agreements,
and fighting has continued in eastern DRC, particularly in Ituri District and the Kivus. The Inter-
Congolese Dialogue (ICD) was first convened in 2001, in an effort to address the internal aspects
of the DRC conflict. In December 2002, the parties to the ICD signed the Global and Inclusive
Accord for the Transition in DRC, paving the way for the establishment of a transitional
government to be installed in June 2003. It included all the main Congolese belligerents.7
ICD participants adopted 36 resolutions relating to the establishment of sustainable peace,
including a resolution on the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers and vulnerable
persons and a resolution relating to the emergency programs in different social sectors that
outlines specific policies for emergency social aid for children and youth. More than 90 percent
of the battalions of Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) withdrew from positions in DRC in
6
Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and the MLC signed the cease-fire. The RCD and
Burundian, Rwandan and Ugandan opposition armed groups that operate in DRC were not signatories to
the Lusaka Agreement
7
According to the agreement, Joseph Kabila will remain as the President of DRC for two years, leading to a general
election. Four vice presidents will represent key groups: the government, the MLC, the RCD and the non-armed
opposition. In reality, the DRC government and the MLC will likely share control over approximately 70 percent of
the country. For further details on the structure of the transitional government, see UN Affected Populations or other
political analyses
5
October 2002,8 but retained a presence in Bunia, in accordance with the bilateral agreement
signed between Uganda and DRC.
1.2 Statement of the research problem
The Democratic republic of Cong conflict, fuelled by exploitation of natural resources and power
struggles, is characterized as one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises and the most deadly
war ever documented in Africa. Over the past five years, the forces of at least six African
countries and numerous non-state armed groups have been involved in the conflict in DRC. Both
foreign and domestic parties to the conflict have committed gross violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law, including widespread abuses against Congolese children and
adolescents. The situation in DRC is also a result of decades of poor governance and broader
regional insecurity.
The DRC conflict has contributed to the insecurity in the wider Great Lakes region through
proliferation of arms and also increase in the number refugees who in turn result in breeding
space for rebel and terrorist groups formation. An urgent approach is needed to end the conflict
in DRC in order to bring faster economic and political development in the region.
8 New Vision, the Ugandan government-owned newspaper, reported that over 2,000 children fathered by UPDF
soldiers are left behind in DRC following the UPDF withdrawal
6
1.3 Objectives
The research seeks to outline the underlying objectives in order to address issues in the entire
study.

  1. To evaluate the causes of conflict in the Democratic Republic Congo.
  2. To evaluate conflict management approaches put in place to bring lasting peace in
    Democratic Republic Congo.
  3. To assess social economic impact of the conflict to the Democratic Republic Congo and
    neighboring countries in the Great Lakes Region.
    1.4 Literature review
    The literature review will focus on following themes: The causes of conflict in DRC which
    include: mineral resources in fueling and financing conflict, poor governance and external
    interest. Secondly the conflict management approaches put in place to solve the conflict with
    special emphasis on local mechanisms and international interventions and lastly the impact of the
    conflict to social economic development in DRC and the entire Great Lakes Region.
    1.4.1 Causes of Conflict in DRC
    The role of mineral resources in fuelling the long running conflict in the eastern provinces of the
    Democratic Republic the Congo (DRC) has attracted considerable international attention.
    Spurred in part by media reports about’ conflict minerals’ and the success of the Kimberley
    Process in stemming the flow of so-called blood diamonds, the Congolese Government, mineral
    importers, international donors and the United Nations have all started to take concrete steps to break mineral–conflict links. These are aimed ultimately at allowing the trade in certain key
    minerals originating in eastern DRC to continue while excluding armed actors for economic
    benefits, allowing the restoration of security and space for post-conflict peace building.9
    Minerals have played an important role in more than a decade of armed conflict in eastern DRC.
    By tapping into and controlling the informal trade in precious metals and gemstones, rebel leader
    Laurent Kabila was able to build an opposition army and overthrow the regime of Mobutu Sese
    Seko in 1997. Later, newly formed armed groups opposing the governments of Laurent (1997–
    2001) and then Joseph Kabila (2001–present) followed the same strategy, often openly supported
    by either Rwanda or Uganda, in their efforts to gain territorial control.
    Foreign incursions into eastern DRC, and Rwandan Hutu rebels who had spilled over into
    eastern DRC in the wake of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, progressively engaged in illicit
    resource trade as a source of finance and means of survival. Besides non-state armed groups,
    regular armed forces of the Forces armées dela République démocratique du Congo (FARDC,
    Armed Forces of the DRC) are also involved in exploiting mineral commodity chains to enrich
    themselves or, in some cases, to make up for low and unpaid wages. The FARDC’s ranks
    include large numbers of former rebels; many of them, particularly a substantial new in flux in
    eastern DRC since 2009, are only superficially integrated into the FARDC command structure
    and retain their former composition. Elements of the regular army, up to and including highranking
    officers, are involved in the various forms of exploitation, which range from ad hoc
    looting attacks to investment in mineral trading enterprises
    Eastern DRC refers to the provinces of Nord-Kivu, Sud-Kivu and Maniema; Ituri district in Orientalec province;
    and Tanganika district (North Katanga) in Katanga province. See the map on p. viii
    The aim of securing control of lucrative mining areas and positions in mineral trading chains has
    resulted in sometimes violent rivalry between FARDC units and has undermined effective
    command and control within the FARDC. Some former rebels, even those who have embarked
    on integration or demobilization, have defected from the FARDC and rejoined non-state forces,
    dissatisfied with slow progress and poor and often delayed payments. In addition, competition
    between non-military actors such as local state and customary authorities, mining enterprises,
    and miners’ cooperatives, has frequently turned violent. Responses aimed at breaking resource–
    conflict links in eastern DRC have sometimes been constrained by a narrow understanding of
    what constitute conflict resources, seeing them as resources ‘that originate from areas controlled
    by forces or factions opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized governments, and are
    used to fund military action in opposition to those governments’.10
    On 10 March 2011 the mining ban was lifted. It is not yet clear how successful it was in starving
    out military actors from mining and trading areas, or at what cost. It appears, however, that
    cassiterite production has fallen—and continued to do so even after the ban was lifted—because
    the main international buyer decided not to accept any minerals that could not be traced back to
    the mine of origin. This seems to have reduced military presence in some cassiterite mines. For
    example, according to UN experts, the mining sites of Bisie and Omate in Walikale territory,
    Nord-Kivu, have been progressively demilitarized since the lifting of the ban11
    10 See e.g. United Nations, General Assembly, ‘The role of diamonds in fuelling conflict: breaking the link between
    the illicit transaction of rough diamonds and armed conflict as a contribution to prevention and settlement of
    conflicts’, A/RES/55/56, 29 Jan. 2001.
    11 United Nations, Security Council, Interim report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the
    Congo, S/2011/345, 7 June 2011, p. 12
    Organized looting is the most direct and coercive form of military involvement in the mineral
    commodity chain. In looting operations, sites are attacked, populations scattered and their
    minerals and other goods taken. Armed groups usually loot sites over which they do not exercise
    control. FARDC elements and purely criminal groups are also known to carry out looting
    attacks, often pretending to be rebels or militia in order to disguise their identity.12 In turn,
    FARDC units can start or use rumors of impending looting attacks by illegal armed groups to
    justify their deployment in mining areas.13 For these reasons, attribution of looting attack to a
    particular group, in media or other reports, should be treated with caution
    .Looting attacks on mines, trading hubs and other communities are most frequently reported in
    Walikale territory, North Kivu. Such attacks are part of armed groups’ wider strategy of targeting
    commercial competitors, disrupting FARDC deployments and creating disorder to prevent the
    return of refugees. One group apparently behind many of the attacks is Mai-Mai Sheka (also
    known as Nduma Defence for Congo), which often cooperates with elements of the FDLR’s
    Montana Battalion.14 Mai-Mai Sheka is named after its leader, Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi, a man who
    apparently had no military experience prior to founding the group in mid-2009 but had worked
    with several mining companies and cooperatives prospecting for and trading minerals in Bisie.
    As he had relied on the 85th FARDC brigade for protection, his activities were effectively
    curtailed when the 85th brigade was driven out of the mine of Bisie at the beginning of 2009.
    According to the UN Group of Experts, the Mai-Mai mainly comprises deserters from the 85th
    12 Sematumba, O., ‘The FDLR in North and South Kivu: a state within a state’, Pole Institute, Guerillas in the Mist:
    The Congolese Experience of the FDLR War in Eastern Congo and the Role of the International Community (Pole
    Institute: Goma, Feb. 2010), p. 16.
    13 Bilonda, K., Director, Progrès des peuples indigènes [Progress of Indigenous Peoples], Interview with the author,
    Kalemie, 7 June 2009.
    14 United Nations, S/2010/596 (note 11), p. 40
    brigade. It is also claimed to rely on military support from the deputy commander of the FARDC
    8th military region, Colonel Etienne Bindu. While Sheka claims that his primary aim is to resist
    the return to Walikale of Congolese refugees currently in Rwanda, his true aim seems to be to reestablish
    a foothold in the local mining sector.15
    1.4.1.1 External actors in DRC conflict
    Many of the armed forces operating in DRC have splintered into various movements and shifted
    alliances over the years. Rights abuses committed against children by combatants associated with
    all armed groups in DRC are really and well documented. Moreover, the occupation of large
    portions of DRC by the armies of neighbouring states has caused considerable suffering among
    children and other vulnerable groups. In 2002, most foreign armed forces withdrew from
    positions in DRC.
    When conflict erupted in 1998, the governments of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe supported
    the DRC government by deploying elements of their national armed forces to positions in DRC.
    At the same time, Rwandan and Ugandan armed forces fought alongside the Congolese
    opposition groups, many of which they helped to create, including Congolese Rally for
    Democracy-Goma (RCD-G), the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) and the
    Congolese Rally for Democracy-Kisangani (RCDK), now known as Congolese Rally for
    Democracy-Kisangani/Liberation Movement (RCD-K/ML)16
    15 United Nations, S/2010/596 (note 11), pp. 15–17.
    16 The Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) and the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) split into
    two factions in 1999, the RCD-Goma (RCD-G)and the RCD-Kisangani (RCD-K), which later became RCD-K/ML.
    The armed forces of Uganda have traditionally supported the RCD-K/ML and the MLC, while the armed forces of
    Rwanda have traditionally supported RCD-Goma. DRC receives considerable financial and technical assistance from its traditional partners such as
    the US, France and Belgium, which is directed towards building state capacity and strengthening
    the country’s institutions of governance. New partners like South Africa, China and Angola have
    also been very important contributors to post-conflict reconstruction efforts in the DRC.
    However, as Theodore Trefon argues in his analysis of the relationship between foreign aid and
    political reform in the DRC, there has been little political energy or commitment from the
    capitals of these countries to align support for post-conflict reconstruction with the democratic
    aspirations of the Congolese people.17
    This tendency remains detrimental to democratization efforts in the DRC on at least two fronts.
    Firstly, by staying indifferent to the lack of progress in democratic reform in the DRC, as
    exemplified in the timid international response to the controversial 2011 elections, while at the
    same time providing financial and technical support to the government in Kinshasa, the DRC’s
    external partners are tacitly endorsing and emboldening the Congolese political leadership in its
    anti-democratic disposition. Secondly, some forms of technical and economic cooperation with
    the DRC tend to have the unintended effect of perpetuating the corrupt and repressive culture
    inherent in the system. Such is the case with the security assistance provided by South Africa and
    Angola as elements of the DRC’s police force trained by them are believed to form part of
    Kabila’s security apparatus used to violently suppress opposition protests. The same could be
    said of some of the investment decisions of other partners such as China and the European
    17 Trefon Theodore 2011 Congo Masquerade the political culture of Aid inefficiency and reform failure. London.
    Zed books
    12
    Union, which have been criticized for reinforcing the web of corrupt links between foreign
    business and political patronage in the DRC.18
    Generating and sustaining sufficient momentum for political reform in the DRC therefore
    requires a commitment from regional and global powers to rethink the nature of their
    engagement in the DRC. In particular, there should be a conscious effort to reconfigure the
    delivery of development assistance, trade relations and investment decisions so that they become
    instruments for supporting rather than obstructing the process of democratization in the country.
    This should be backed by a bold diplomatic drive, both at the bilateral and multilateral levels, to
    put pressure on Congolese politicians to work as a collective towards greater political reform in
    the country.
    1.4.1.2 Illicit Exploitation of Natural Resources
    Since July 2001, the UN Security Council has received reports from a panel of independent
    experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in DRC. A 2002 report (S/2002/565) states
    that armed combatants are driven by a desire to control resources and finance their operations by
    riches gained from the exploitation of key mineral resources: cobalt, coltan, copper, diamonds
    and gold. The use of children as forced labourers is a key component in the illicit exploitation of
    natural resources, Forced displacement, killings, sexual assaults and abuse of power for
    economic gain are directly linked to military forces’ control of resource extraction sites or their
    presence in the vicinity. Almost no revenues are allocated to public services, such as utilities,
    health services and schools.
    18 See Michael diebert .”EU involvement in DRC mining draws protests”. Inter press service 28 October 2008
    available on http//ipsnews.net(Accessed on 15th June 2015) Local and foreign actors, including foreign armies, foreign armed opposition groups, Congolese
    armed opposition groups and Mai Mai militias, are implicated in the exploitation of natural
    resources in DRC. For example, Rwanda is alleged to export millions of dollars of coltan
    annually; Uganda is alleged to export huge quantities of gold and diamonds; Zimbabwe has
    rights to export Congolese tropical timber; and Angola has control of a large segment of the
    Congolese petrol industry. The panel of independent experts has also named 85 international
    business enterprises based in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Europe, the Middle East and North
    America that are considered to be in violation of the guidelines for multinational enterprises of
    the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).19
    Burundi, Central African Republic, Kenya, Mozambique, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South
    Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe are named as key transit routes for
    commodities from DRC. The panel of independent experts also reports that links to individuals,
    companies, governments and criminal networks in the trafficking of natural resources are well
    established. The Lusaka Agreement does not address the illegal exploitation of natural resources
    and other economic interests, which, according to Oxfam, are a stronger driving force than
    political power for the continuation of conflict in DRC.
    Analysts argue that action must be taken to address the illicit exploitation of natural resources in
    DRC if sustainable peace is to be achieved. In this context, the government of DRC officially For complete list of businesses, see Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
    Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (S/2002/1146), Annex III. For more information on the OECD
    guidelines, see www.oecd.org. launched its national diamond certification program on January 7, 2003, as part of its
    participation in the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme, which is intended to limit the illicit
    exploitation of diamonds.20
    The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)
    is the UN’s peacekeeping operation in DRC, established in 1999. In December 2002, the
    Security Council authorized a size increase of up to 8,700 military personnel, principally
    comprised of two task forces to be deployed in succession, when the caseload of the first task
    force can no longer be met by its capacity (UN Security Council Resolution 1445, paragraph.
    10). According to MONUC representatives, as of early June 2003 the force size is approximately
    6,000 military personnel.
    Deployment of the second task force has not yet been authorized. MONUC also includes up to
    700 military observers supported by specialists in human rights, humanitarian affairs, public
    information, political affairs, child protection and medical and administrative support. In addition
    to other duties, MONUC is mandated to facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights
    monitoring, with attention to vulnerable groups including women and children. This includes
    special attention to demobilized child soldiers. However, MONUC’s mandate to protect civilians
    is limited to civilians in imminent danger in the presence of MONUC armed units.21
    The Kimberly Process is a negotiating procedure to establish minimum, acceptable international standards for
    national certification schemes of import and export of rough diamonds in an effort to stem the flow of rough
    diamonds from conflict areas, thereby contributing to the sustainability of peace and protecting the legitimate
    diamond industry. For more information on the Kimberly Process, seewww.kimberlyprocess.com.
    21 Critics of MONUC have argued that the force is weak and unable to improve the human rights situation for three
    primary reasons: 1) the small size of the force operating in a vast area; 2) the limited civilian protection mandate;
    and 3) the general atmosphere of insecurity. According to the International Crisis Group, the addition of at least
    3,000 troops in Phase III of the operation, to total 8,700, will not be enough to make a differenc MONUC also strictly prohibits any act of sexual abuse and/or exploitation by members of the
    military and civilian components of MONUC and considers such behaviour as a serious act of
    misconduct. In December 2002, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General
    circulated a memorandum clarifying MONUC’s policy on prohibition of sexual abuse and/or
    exploitation by all civilian and military components of MONUC. Among the prohibited activities
    are any exchange of money, goods or services for sex and sexual activity with persons under age
    MONUC’s Child Protection Section is the largest of any UN peacekeeping operation and is the
    first to include Child Protection Advisers (CPAs) deployed in the field. The high level of
    attention paid to the protection of children in DRC by the UN is, in part, a result of the work of
    this Section. In 2003, the Watch list published research on the abysmal record of attention to
    child protection issues in all UN Security Council resolutions and reports of the UN Secretary
    General on conflict situations. However, resolutions and reports on the DRC have addressed
    child protection more than those relating to any other conflict area in the world. This is a direct
    testament to the efforts of the Child Protection Section of MONUC. The mandate for the Section
    derives from Security Council resolutions related to DRC and to children and armed conflict
    (CAC). CPAs have been deployed as part of MONUC since February 2000.
    1.4.2 Social Economic impact of DRC conflict
    The term ‘Great Lakes Region’, although used literally, does not have a common, shared
    interpretation. In the context of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
    (ICGLR)22 the term denotes eleven African states, seven of whom, namely Burundi, the
    Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, are
    22For details and an overview of the ICGLR visit http://www.icglr.org
    perched on the shores of Africa’s largest lakes: Victoria, Tanganyika, Albert and Kivu. The
    remaining four ICGLR member states: Angola, the Central African Republic (CAR), the
    Republic of Congo – Brazzaville and Sudan, do not enjoy such proximity to the lakes. In this
    paper the term ‘Great Lakes Region’ has a restrictive interpretation and is confined to the ‘core’
    Great Lakes states of Burundi, the DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda.23
    While refugees continue to dominate the discourse on forced displacement, a number of other
    forms of human mobility demand attention. First and foremost of these are internally displaced
    persons (IDPs).24. Displacement has become a coping strategy in respect of yet another stimulus
    – marked disruption in the ecosystem which renders it temporarily or permanently unsuitable to
    support human life.25 The likely impact of climate change on population movements has been
    described by one source as follows: ‘Estimates have suggested that between 25 million to one
    billion people could be displaced by climate change over the next 40years.’The third, final
    category is no less contentious. Often described as ‘undocumented migrants’, ‘irregular
    migrants’ or ‘migrants in an irregular situation’, these displaced persons represent another
    manifestation of contemporary human mobility.26 Given the range of sub-categories of forced
    displacement in the Great Lakes Region, the present study is confined to the two most lasting
    and visible manifestations– refugees and internally displaced persons.
    23 Henri Médard and Shane Doyle (eds), in Slavery in the Great Lakes Region of East Africa, Oxford: James Currey,
    2007, give a persuasive explanation of the term ‘Great Lakes Region’.
    24 Details can be found on the website of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) at
    http://www.internaldisplacement.org (accessed 2 December 2011
    25 Norwegian Refugee Council, Future floods of refugees: a comment on climate change, conflict and forced
    migration, 2008, citing E El-Hinnawi, Environmental refugees, New York: United Nations Environment Program
    (UNEP), 1995, http://www.nrc.no/arch/_img/9268480.pdf (accessed 17 May 2012)..
    26According to the
    IOM,theterm‘illegalmigrant’,whichiswidelyusedbydraftersofnationallegislationgoverningimmigrationandresidence,c
    arriesacriminalconnotationandseenasdenyingmigrants’humanity:seeGlossaryonmigration,2nded,Geneva:IOM,2011,
    54,http://joomla.corteidh.or.cr:8080/joomla/images/stories/Observaciones/11/Anexo%205.pdf (accessed 17May
    2012).
    Statistics on refugees and IDPs in the region are presented both as a way of contextualizing the
    ensuing discussion and providing a backdrop to the search for appropriate and sustainable
    responses. Besides revealing the trends of displacement in the region, the data enable us to
    determine the magnitude of the problem relative to other geographical locations on the continent
    and beyond. Of all documented cases of forced displacements, ‘protracted refugee situations’
    (PRS) are the most serious.
    Importantly, data show that the gravity of the situation in the Great Lakes Region is particularly
    acute on account of population size and duration, both of which far outstrip the thresholds of a
    PRS. A key hypothesis of this paper is that there is an intimate link between forced displacement,
    on the one hand, and governance and armed conflict on the other. A second hypothesis is on the
    role (adequacy or otherwise) of policy, institutional and legal frameworks in the displacement–
    conflict nexus. It is concluded that there does exist causal link (even if not direct and linear)
    between the high incidence of displacement in the region and governance challenges, as well as
    the seemingly endless armed conflicts raging in the region. Inadequacies at policy, institutional
    or legal level are an aggravating factor. In view of this, the study recommends first and foremost
    that rather than approaching displacement as a transitional phenomenon, policymakers should
    begin formulating mid- and long-term strategies in appreciation of the lasting nature of the
    phenomenon.
    In broad terms, the ‘migration and development’ paradigm should be adapted. More specifically,
    mitigation and possible disruption of the displacement–a conflict link seem to call for greater
    focus and resources in the following areas: entrenchment of an evidence-based culture in formulating policy interventions; fostering a culture of broad, purposeful consultations with
    stakeholders in policy formulation and implementation; and ensuring a more robust
    implementation and enforcement of treaty obligations pertinent to forced displacement.
    1.4.3 Conflict management approaches
    Several conflict management initiatives have been put in place to try and bring about sustainable
    peace n the Democratic Republic of Congo both local and international approaches under the
    African Union and United Nations mandate.
    1.4.3.1 Peace agreement Initiatives
    In July 1999, under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the DRC
    government, Congolese armed opposition groups and foreign states signed the Lusaka Ceasefire
    Agreement.27 To monitor this agreement as requested, the UN deployed peacekeeping operation,
    United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).
    Also, in accordance with the agreement, several foreign countries involved in the conflict began
    to disengage. Most foreign troops, including those of Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and
    Zimbabwe, withdrew during 2002. The Rwandan and Ugandan withdrawals were arranged
    through two separate bilateral peace agreements with the government of DRC. Most signatories
    have not upheld peace agreements, and fighting has continued in eastern DRC, particularly in
    Ituri District and the Kivu.
    27
    Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and the MLC signed the cease-fire. The RCD and Burundian,
    Rwandan and Ugandan opposition armed groups that operate in DRC were not signatories to the Lusaka Agreement
    19
    The Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) was first convened in 2001, in an effort to address the
    internal aspects of the DRC conflict. In December 2002, the parties to the ICD signed the Global
    and Inclusive Accord for the Transition in DRC, paving the way for the establishment of a
    transitional government to be installed in June 2003. It included all the main Congolese
    belligerents.28
    ICD participants adopted 36 resolutions relating to the establishment of sustainable peace,
    including a resolution on the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers and vulnerable
    persons and a resolution relating to the emergency programs in different social sectors that
    outlines specific policies for emergency social aid for children and youth. More than 90 percent
    of the battalions of Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) withdrew from positions in DRC in
    October 2002,29 but retained a presence in Bunia, in accordance with the bilateral agreement
    signed between Uganda and DRC. Amnesty International (AI) and other human rights groups
    have raised concerns about the lack of impartiality by the UPDF in violence in Ituri District. In
    accordance with agreements, UPDF forces officially withdrew from Ituri District in April 2003,
    leading to an outbreak of extreme violence and insecurity.
    As evidenced by the crisis in Ituri District, the withdrawal of foreign troops from positions in
    DRC has not brought peace, ended economic exploitation or stopped human rights abuses. While
    troop withdrawals have been strongly endorsed by the international community and have
    28
    According to the agreement, Joseph Kabila will remain as the President of DRC for two years, leading to a
    general election. Four vice presidents will represent key groups: the government, the MLC, the RCD and the nonarmed
    opposition. In reality, the DRC government and the MLC will likely share control over approximately 70
    percent of the country. For further details on the structure of the transitional government, see UN Affected
    Populations or other political analyses
    29
    New Vision, the Ugandan government-owned newspaper, reported that over 2,000 children fathered by UPDF
    soldiers are left behind in DRC following the UPDF withdrawal
    20
    undoubtedly fuelled initiatives towards peace, the lack of security and ongoing violence have
    cast a dark shadow on the overall progress of the Lusaka Agreement and also jeopardized the
    sustainability of positive results achieved thus far. In addition to the situation in Ituri District, the
    International Crisis Group and other analysts point to ongoing conflict in the Kivu as a
    fundamental obstacle to the achievement of sustainable peace. This situation has not been
    adequately addressed in recruitment of children and targeting of social infrastructure in the
    Kivus, particularly by RCD-G. Humanitarian organizations report an increase in the number of
    victims of sexual abuse, including rape of young girls by RCD-G in South Kivu
    1.4.3.2 Joint Military Operations
    1.4.3.2.1 Umoja Wetu (Our unity)
    In late 2008, the governments of Rwanda and Congo agreed on a wide range of issues and agreed
    to launch a joint military offensive against the CNDP and the FDLR. They also agreed to restore
    full diplomatic relations and to activate economic cooperation. In January 2009, Rwanda and
    Congo launched a joint military operation in eastern Congo. The military operation dislodged
    and seriously weakened the CNDP forces. In January, the leader of the CNDP, General Laurent
    Nkunda, was arrested inside Rwanda, after he fled eastern Congo. The FDLR forces were also
    dislodged from their stronghold in North Kivu and forced to retreat. More than 2,000 Rwandan
    refugees returned home in January and February, as well as some FDLR militia members.
    In late February 2009, Rwandan troops pulled out of Congo as part of the agreement with the
    Kabila government. The government of Congo has requested the extradition of General Nkunda.
    Nkunda still remains under arrest in Rwanda. Congolese forces continued to go after the remaining CNDP and FDLR forces. As part of an earlier agreement, those CNDP forces willing
    to join the Congolese army were integrated. Rwanda also welcomed FDLR forces willing to
    return home. Meanwhile, remnants of the FDLR continue to target Congolese civilians. In late
    April 2009, United Nations officials accused the FDLR of committing serious atrocities against
    civilians in Luofu, a town north of Goma.30
    1.4.3.2.2 Operation Kimia II (silent operation)
    After the withdrawal of Rwandan forces and the completion of Operation Umoja Wetu, the
    government of Congo, with the support of MONUC forces, launched Operation Kimia II. In
    Eastern Congo, government forces targeted FDLR militia, especially in mining areas. According
    to a December 2009 report by the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, “the role
    played by MONUC in Kimia II continued to be focused on assisting FARDC with planning and
    on providing logistical support, including tactical helicopter lift, medical evacuation, fuel and
    rations.”31
    The report also stated that MONUC provided military support to government forces.
    Kimia II operations involved an estimated 16,000 government forces in North and South Kivu,
    according to U.N. officials.
    1.4.3.2.3 Amani Leo (Peace Today)
    On December 31, 2009, the government of Congo ended Operation Kimia II and in February
    2010 launched Operation Amani Leo. According to United Nations officials, the objectives of
    30 http://allafrica.com/stories/200904271233.html.
    31 Report of the U.N. Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
    Congo, December 4, 2009.
    Amani Leo are to protect civilians, remove negative forces from population centers, re-establish
    authority in liberated areas, and restore state authority. According to a directive signed by
    Congolese military Chief of Staff General Didier Etumba and MONUC Force Commander
    Lieutenant General Babacar Gayer, Congolese and MONUC forces “will concentrate on
    controlling strategic areas in order to ensure that armed groups, notably FDLR elements, will not
    be able to retake territory and inflict reprisals.”32 The Congolese government and MONUC also
    agreed “the deployment of Military Police at the battalion level in order to prevent and sanction
    violations of human rights, international humanitarian and refugee law by their own forces. A
    zero tolerance policy for human rights violations will be strictly enforced.”
    1.4.3.3 MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC)
    On May 28, 2010, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1925. The Congolese
    government had asked for the gradual withdrawal of the U.N. peacekeeping force. The resolution
    converted the name and mission of the current peacekeeping force from the U.N. Organization
    Mission in DRC (MONUC) to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the
    DRC (MONUSCO) effective July 1, 2010. The resolution also authorized MONUSCO’s
    mandate until June 30, 2011, and ordered the withdrawal of up to 2,000 peacekeeping troops by
    June 30, 2010.The resolution also called for the protection of civilians and humanitarian
    workers; support for the DRC government on a wide range of issues; and support for
    international efforts to bring perpetrators to justice. In June 2010, U.N. Secretary General Ban
    Ki-moon appointed former U.S. Ambassador to the DRC Roger Meece as the special
    representative and head of the U.N. mission in DRC.
    32 MONUC News. After Operation Kimia II, January 2010
    23
    1.4.3.4 MONUC (United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC)
    In August 1999, the United Nations Security Council authorized the deployment of 90 United
    Nations military liaison personnel to the DRC. In November 1999, Security Council Resolution
    1279 affirmed that the previously authorized United Nations personnel would constitute the
    United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC). The operation is authorized under
    Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which allows peacekeepers to use force, if necessary,
    to carry out their mandate. Over the past decade, the Security Council passed a number of
    resolutions to strengthen MONUC’s force and its mandate. Resolution 1291, passed in 2000,
    authorized MONUC to carry out a number of important tasks, including implementation of the
    cease-fire agreement, verification of disengagement and redeployment of forces, and support for
    humanitarian work and human rights monitoring. The resolution provided MONUC the mandate,
    under Chapter VII, to protect its personnel, facilities, and civilians under imminent threat of
    physical violence.
    Resolution 1565, adopted in 2004, increased MONUC personnel, with a primary objective of
    MONUC deployment to eastern Congo to ensure civilian protection and seize or collect arms, as
    called for in U.N. resolution 1493. The resolution also authorized MONUC too temporarily
    provide protection to the National Unity Government institutions and government officials.
    Resolution 1493 authorized MONUC to assist the DRC government to disarm foreign
    combatants and repatriate them to their home countries. The resolution, under Chapter VII,
    authorized MONUC to use “all means necessary” to carry out its mandate.33
    33 http://www.monuc.org. (Accessed on 20th June 2015)
    24
    In December 2009, Security Council resolution 1906 authorized MONUC’s mandate until the
    end of May 2010. The Kabila government has asked for the withdrawal of MONUC forces by
  4. A U.N. Security Council delegation was scheduled to visit Congo in late April 2010 but
    was postponed to May due to travel complications. In mid-May, a Security Council delegation
    visited the DRC and met with senior Congolese officials. The delegation was led by Ambassador
    Gerard Araud of France. According to Ambassador Araud, “The mission of the Security Council
    was to begin a dialogue with the authorities, population and civil society of the Democratic
    Republic of the Congo over the future of the United Nations presence.”34
    As of February 2010, MONUC had 20,573 total uniformed personnel, including 18,645 troops,
    760 military observers, 1,216 police, 1,001 international civilian personnel, 2,690 local civilian
    staff and 629 United Nations Volunteers.35MONUC is currently the largest U.N. peacekeeping
    operation in the world.
    1.4.2 Findings
    From the literature review the research has been able to address the objectives of the study that is
    the causes of the DRC conflict management mechanisms put in place and the social economic
    impact on the country and the Great Lakes Region. The conflict revolves around minerals
    resources management and the interference by external actors mainly neighboring countries who
    want to exploit valuable minerals by supporting rebel groups such as M23 .This is well captured
    by the greed grievance theory in the subsequent chapters.
    34 http://allafrica.com/stories/201005171804.html.accessed May 2015
    35 MONUC Mission website available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/
    1.5 Justification of research
    The research will contribute to the existing knowledge in research on the possible ways of
    solving the long running conflict in the DRC and bring faster economic prosperity in the country
    and the greater Great Lakes Region. The research seeks to maximize on the gap of lack of civic
    awareness among the people as many people in the region lack education and information on the
    need of peace to utilize the immense resources at their disposal. Most researchers have focused
    on equitable distribution of resources to bring about peace and also deploying of more security
    personnel to bring about peace. The research will bridge this gap.
    Lastly, the DRC Congo conflict is a reality in the modern day times and a lot of research needs to
    be conducted to ascertain the exact causes and device remedies to bring about everlasting peace
    in the country and Africa as a whole. The conflict has negative ramifications to the overall peace
    of continent. This research will contribute towards realizing this noble goal.
    1.6 Theoretical Analysis
    The research will adopt greed grievance theory to investigate the causes of conflicts in the Great
    Lakes region with main focus on DRC. Grievance here include bad governance, unequal
    distribution of benefits emanating from Natural resources as in the case of DRC Congo,
    marginalization of communities as in the case of pastoralist communities in East Africa,
    corruption, ethnicity among others.
    Greed on other hands in this research includes: illegal mining of mineral resources in the DRC
    by the army, militia groups and rebels. It also manifested in poor governance where certain communities refuse to involve others in governance as in the case of Hutu and Tutsi which led to
    genocide in Rwanda. Rebel groups in the Great Lakes region are driven by greed to control
    mineral resources thus accelerating conflicts in the region.
    The research will use the theory to underscore the relevance of grievances and greed in causing
    conflicts. When grievances are not addressed in time people will always resort to other means to
    address their problems. In most cases these means are characterized by greed and selfishness.
    1.7 Hypotheses
  5. The causes of Conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo and how they have brought
    about stagnated development in the country.
  6. Impact of DRC conflict in relation to both Social and Economic underdevelopment in the
    country and spillover effects on neighboring states in the region.
  7. Conflict management Strategies which have been put in place in trying to end the conflict
    in DRC both at country level and regional level.
    1.8 Research Methodology
    The research design used is a descriptive analysis. The method used for the study was content
    analysis. This is a natural way of finding out the natural world and understands the way people
    interpret it. This was the most appropriate method for the researcher to gain more detailed
    information on the Democratic Republic of Congo conflict. The data collection method is
    primarily secondary data mainly from already published research which include journals,
    websites and books on the subject of DRC conflict.
    This is a method of collecting information by reviewing past research and literature within the
    view of subjectivist approach which applies qualitative methods using a humanistic and
    phenomenological approach. This approach relies on data collection from past research in light
    of the human perspective and therefore involves collecting feelings, emotions and perceptions
    when interpreting phenomenon under study regarding the DRC conflict thus the choice of
    qualitative research method.
    For this study, the sampling method used was non-probability purposive sampling. Owing to the
    nature of the study, past research and case study analysis was used to collect data. Purposive
    heterogeneity sampling is a method that aims at getting a sample research and case studies with
    similar characteristics or traits. The data collected is very relevant to the conflict of DRC.
    The research project will adopt discourse analysis, this is very appropriate to the analysis of the
    data collected in the study. This system helps to establish objectives in data. These included
    causes of causes of conflict, conflict management systems employed both local and international
    mechanisms, social economic impact of the conflict in DRC. The data for this study will be
    obtained from secondary sources. The data will be descriptive. Guided by the objectives and
    Greed grievance theory, the data will be arranged according to the major themes.
    Use of secondary will cut on the cost of research work in relation to designing questionnaires,
    conducting interviews and administration of the same. Use of secondary data is both time saving
    and effective in this research project
    1.9 Scope and Limitations.
    Time limitations because of the large geographical area of the Great Lakes Region I might not be
    able to travel to each individual state to collect data. But this will be solved through using
    secondary data from Publications, Internet sources, and journals which have written about the
    subject matter.
    Secondly, since the study relies on secondary data to analyze the conflict in the DRC some
    materials may not be exactly and precise than if it were through use of primary data collection
    tools such as Interviews and Questionnaires.+-
    1.10 Chapter outline.
    Chapter one: Introduction
    This chapter starts by introducing conflict in the Great Lakes Region focusing mainly on the
    Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by first setting the broad context of the research study, the
    statement of the problem, objectives, justification, literature review, theoretical framework
    hypotheses, the methodology of the study and finally the scope and Limitations.
    Chapter Two: Conceptual analysis
    This chapter adopts the Greed Grievance theory in analyzing the main motivation behind the
    DRC in relation to causes of the conflict and some of the issues that are not addresses during
    conflict management. This section examines the Greed and Grievance starting with global,
    continental and more specifically to DRC conflict.
    Chapter Three: Case Study Democratic Republic of Congo conflict
    This chapter mainly focuses on the descriptive nature of the DRC conflict. This chapter gives the
    genesis of the conflict in relation to causes, impacts and some of the conflict management
    mechanisms which have been employed to end the conflict itself.
    Chapter Four: Critical Analysis: Overview Democratic Republic of Congo conflict
    This chapter critically analyses the role of continued bad governance since independence
    characterized by totalitarian rule in times of Mobutu to Kabila. Bad governance is what enhances
    other causes of conflict in DRC the country has been marred by election malpractices resulting in
    post elections violence thus making the already war torn country worse in the recent years.
    The chapter also draws the relationship between poor governance and mismanagement of
    resources, corruption and weak state security institutions. In summary bad governance enhances
    other causes of conflict in DRC since the Government itself is illegitimate.
    Chapter Five: Conclusion and Recommendation
    This chapter provides conclusions of the study, gives recommendations and provides suggestions
    on areas for further study.


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